We consider the following dynamic load balancing game: Given an initial assignment of jobs to identical parallel machines, the system is modified; specifically, some machines are added or removed. Each job's cost is the load on the machine it is assigned to; thus, when machines are added, jobs have an incentive to migrate to the new unloaded machines. When machines are removed, the jobs assigned to them must be reassigned. Consequently, other jobs might also benefit from migrations. In our job-extension penalty model, for a given extension parameter δ ≥ 0, if the machine on which a job is assigned to in the modified schedule is different from its initial machine, then the job's processing time is extended by δ.
Introduction
The well-studied load balancing problem considers a scenario in which a set of jobs needs to be assigned on a set of identical parallel machines. Each job j, is associated with a processing time p j and the goal is to balance the load on the machines. In contrast to the traditional load balancing problem, where a central designer determines the allocation of jobs to machines and all the participating entities are assumed to obey the protocol, in the load balancing game, each job is owned by a selfish agent who wishes to optimize its own objective.
Given an assignment, each job incurs a cost which is equal to the total load on the machine it is assigned to. This cost function characterizes systems in which jobs are processed in parallel, conversion, etc.). Clients might choose to switch to a mirror server. Such a change would require repeating the preprocessing work on the new server.
Another example of a system in which extension penalty occurs is of an RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service. In this service, a cloud of servers enables service to simultaneous users. When the system is upgraded, more virtual servers are added. Users might switch to the new servers and get a better service (with less congestion), however, some set-up time and configuration tuning is required for each new user.
Note that in all the above applications, the delay caused due to a migration is independent of the migrating job. A similar, low-tech, application is freight transport, in which the whole cargo ship is delayed when items are added. The registration and handling of a new item takes fixed time, independent of the item's size and weight.
Model and Preliminaries
A job rescheduling setting is defined by the tuple G = ⟨M 0 , M ′ , N, p j , δ⟩, where M 0 is a set of initial identical machines and M ′ is a set of added or removed machines. If the modification is machines' addition, then M ′ is a set of new machines, all identical to the machines in M 0 . If the modification is machines' removal then M ′ ⊆ M 0 . We denote by m 0 , m ′ the number of machines in M 0 , M ′ , respectively. N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of jobs. For each job j ∈ N , p j denotes the processing time of job j. δ > 0 is the extension parameter, i.e, the time penalty that is added to the processing time of a migrating job. An assignment method produces an assignment s = (s(1), . . . , s(n)) of jobs to machines, where s(j) is the machine to which job j is assigned. The assignment is referred to as a schedule. We use s 0 , s to denote the initial and the modified schedules, respectively. In s, the processing time of a job j ∈ N on machine i ∈ M 0 ∪ M ′ is p j if i = s 0 (j) and p j +δ otherwise. The load on a machine i in a schedule s is the sum of the processing times (including the extension penalty) of the jobs assigned to i, that is, L i (s) = An assignment s is a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) if no job j ∈ N can benefit from unilaterally deviating from its machine to another machine; i.e., for every j ∈ N and every machined i ̸ = s(j),
Some of our results refer to outcomes of a sequence of improvement steps. Better-Response Dynamic (RD) is a local-search method where in each step some player is chosen and is allowed to change his assignment, given the assignment of the others. In better-RD, any improvement step can be performed. In best-RD, players select their best possible response. When best-RD or better-RD are performed, one job might migrate several times. The extension penalty is independent of the number of steps and only the final assignment matters. In particular, if j leaves its machine in s 0 and returns to it later, then j is not extended. This is justified by the applications motivating our work -in which the penalty is not due to physical migration cost but due to the adjustment of the job's processing to a new machine.
It is well known that decentralized decision-making may lead to sub-optimal solutions from the point of view of society as a whole. We quantify the inefficiency incurred due to self-interested behavior according to the price of anarchy (PoA) [14, 15] and price of stability (PoS) [1] measures. The P oA is the worst-case inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, while the P oS measures the bestcase inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium. The social objective function we consider is the egalitarian one, i.e., we wish to minimize the cost of the job with the highest cost. In scheduling terms, this is equivalent to minimizing the maximal load on some machine (also known as makespan). For a schedule s, makespan(s) = max j c j (s) = max i L i (s) = L max (s). Formally, Definition 1.1 Let G be a family of games, and let G ∈ G be some game in this family. Let Φ(G) be the set of Nash equilibria of the game G. If Φ(G) ̸ = ∅:
• The price of anarchy of the game G is the ratio between the maximal cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social optimum of G.
The price of anarchy of the family of games G is P oA(G) = Sup G∈G P oA(G).
• The price of stability of the game G is the ratio between the minimal cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social optimum of G. That is,
, and the price of stability of the family of games G is P oS(G) = Sup G∈G P oS(G).
In section 4 we study coordinated deviations. A set of players Γ ⊆ N forms a coalition if there exists a move where each job j ∈ Γ strictly reduces its cost. An assignment s is a strong equilibrium (SE) if there is no coalition Γ ⊆ N that has a beneficial move from s. The strong price of anarchy and the strong price of stability are defined similarly, where Φ(G) refers to the set of strong Nash equilibria.
Related Work
The minimum makespan problem corresponds to the centralized version of our game in which all jobs obey the decisions of one utility. This is a well-studied NP-hard problem. The simple greedy List-scheduling (LS) algorithm [11] provides a (2 − 1 m )-approximation to the minimum makespan problem. A bit better approximation ratio of ( ) is guaranteed by the Longest Processing Time (LPT) algorithm [12] . A PTAS for the minimum makespan problem on identical machines is given in [13] .
In the associated load balancing game, each job is controlled by a selfish agent who aims to minimize its cost -given by the load on the machine it is assigned to. Fotakis et al. showed that LPT-schedules are NE schedules [10] . In [6] , Even-dar et al. analyzed the convergence time of BRD on unrelated machines. Note that our model can be seen as a restricted case of scheduling on unrelated machines. For every job j and machine M i , the processing time of j on M i is p j if i = s 0 (j) and p j + δ otherwise. Our analysis provides tighter results than those known for unrelated machines [5] .
The concept of the price of anarchy (PoA) was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in [14] . They proved that the price of anarchy of job scheduling games is 2 − 1 m . In [9] , Finn and Horowitz presented an upper bound of 2 − 2 m+1 for the price of anarchy in load balancing games with identical machines. Note that in this game, the P oA is equivalent to the makespan approximation.
Other related work deal with cost functions that depend on the internal order of jobs, e.g., in [4, 3] , or cost function that is based on both the congestion on the machine and its activation cost [7] . Coordinated deviations were studied by Andelman et al. in [2] . A survey of results on selfish load balancing appears in [17] . Some of our results bound the inefficiency of a NE produced by a sequence of improvement steps (best or better-RD). Analysis of such sequential NE was initiated in [16] for several other games.
Our Results
We study the problem of equilibrium existence, calculation, and inefficiency in the load rebalancing game with uniform extension penalty. We show that any job scheduling game with added or removed machines possesses at least one Nash equilibrium schedule. Moreover, some optimal solution is also a Nash equilibrium, and thus, the price of stability is 1. We show that in general, the price of anarchy is unbounded when machines are either added or removed. The P oA can be bounded if the modified schedule is achieved by performing improvement steps. Specifically, for a NE that is achieved by performing improvement steps, we show that the P oA is 1. We also analyze the load rebalancing game assuming coordinated deviations are allowed. We prove that a strong equilibrium exists for all system modifications and that the SPoS is 1. We show that the SPoA is 3 for both the adding and removing machines scenarios and that this bound is tight. Moreover, we provide a closer analysis of the strong price of anarchy, and bound this value as a function of the ratio between δ and OP T . Specifically, we show that the strong price of anarchy is 2 + δ OP T and that this bound is tight. Moreover, it is achieved even when the SE is reached by a sequence of coalitional improvement steps. Finally, we show that for any value of δ > 0, it is NP-hard to determine whether a given modified schedule is a SE. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we examine the scenario where m ′ identical machines are added. In Section 3 we examine the scenario in which m ′ machines are removed. In Section 4 we consider coordinated deviation of jobs. For each scenario we consider the problem of equilibrium existence, calculation, and inefficiency, distinguishing between various initial states and convergence methods. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and suggest several directions for future work.
We note that in a dynamic setting in which machines are added or removed and migrations are free of cost (i.e., when δ = 0), then the results known for classic load balancing games apply. In particular, the P oA assuming δ = 0 is 2 − 2 m+1 for a game with m machines in the modified systems. The proofs are identical to the proofs for a fixed number of machines. Thus, the difference between our results and the results for the classic load balancing game are due to the migration penalty.
Machines' Addition
In this section we study the scenario in which the system's modification involves an addition of machines and uniform extension penalty is applied. Specifically, for a given parameter δ > 0, if a job is assigned to a machine different than its original machine then its processing time is extended to be p j + δ. Recall that m 0 , m ′ denote the initial and added number of machines, respectively.
Equilibrium Existence and Computation
Every instance of the load rebalancing game with added machines and uniform extension penalty admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium. This follows from the fact that the sorted machines' load-vector corresponding to the schedule is decreasing lexicographically with any beneficial move. Thus, any better-RD process converges to a NE.
The next question we consider is how many moves are required to reach a NE. The following result shows that, for any given initial assignment, there exists a short sequence of beneficial moves that leads to a NE. Assume that the jobs are sorted according to their processing length, that is,
Max-length best-RD activates the jobs one after the other according to the sorted order. An activated job j plays a best response, i.e., it moves to a machine that minimizes its cost (or remain on s 0 (j) if no beneficial move exists).
We show that after a single phase of max-length best-RD, the system reaches a NE. While this result is valid also for the classic load balancing game [17] , its proof for the load rebalancing game is more involved, since migrating jobs have stronger incentive to return to their initial machine (and get rid of the penalty). 
Proof:
We begin with the following observation.
Claim 2.2
As long as each job moves at most once, the minimal load does not decrease.
Proof:
We show that the minimum load does not decrease as a result of any first move of a job j. Assume that j moves from M a to M b . Since this is the first move of job j, it holds that M a = s 0 (j). Denote by L 0 i , L 1 i the loads on machine M i before and after the move of job j respectively. Denote by L 0 min the minimal load before the move of job j. The move is beneficial for j, thus,
A job j is said to be satisfied if it cannot reduce its cost by migrating to a different machine. By the definition of the cost function with migration penalty, j is satisfied if it is assigned to s 0 (j) and
We show that once a job j was activated and played its best response, it never gets unsatisfied again.
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Assume by contradiction that the claim is false and let j be the first job for which a second beneficial move exists. Let M a = s 0 (j). Assume that on its first move j migrated from M a to M b . Job j might leave M b only if one of the following conditions holds:
We show that none of these conditions hold. We first prove it assuming that the load on M b does not increase, and then consider also the possibility that the load on M b increases after j joins it. Denote by t the time in which job j moves from M a to M b , and let L t min , L t i denote the minimal load and the load on machine i, respectively, at time t. 
Proof:
Since j performs a best move, it must be that L t min = L t b . According to Claim 2.2, the minimal load does not decrease during the game, therefore, the load on each machine is at least L t min . This implies that condition C 1 does not hold and the only machine to which j might move to is
We show that this never happens. In order for the load on machine M a to decrease, there must be a job j ′ that leaves it after the move of j. Since we assume that j is the first job that is migrating twice, it must be that s 0 (j ′ ) = M a . Let M d be the machine to which j ′ moves, and let t ′ be the migration time. Before the move of 
Denote by t ′ the time after the move of job k to M b . M b ̸ = s 0 (k) since we assume that j is the first job that is migrating twice. We know that p j ≥ p k because job j was activated before job k and jobs are activated in non-increasing order of their length. Therefore, for any machine If
Next we consider the case in which job k moves to
Therefore, condition C 2 does not hold and job j will not benefit from migrating back to M a .
We conclude that max-length best-RD reaches a pure Nash equilibrium after each agent is activated at most once. 7
Equilibrium Inefficiency
In this section we bound the price of stability and the price of anarchy of our game, distinguishing between various initial states and convergence methods. For the classic load balancing game, with no extension penalty, it is known that P oS = 1 and P oA = 2 − 2 m+1 . We show that in our model P oS = 1 and the P oA is not bounded by a constant. It can be arbitrary large if the schedule is not achieved by a sequence of improvement steps and bounded by m ′ −1 m 0 + 2 if the schedule is achieved by a sequence of improvement steps. We also show that if the initial schedule is not a NE but the schedule is achieved by performing a sequence of improvement steps, the P oA is bounded by m 0 + m ′ .
It is easy to see that a beneficial move does not increase the makespan. Therefore, by performing best-RD starting from any optimal assignment, we reach a NE whose makespan is equal to the optimum. This implies that the P oS equals 1. We turn to analyze the P oA. We first show that for an arbitrary NE, the P oA is unbounded. The bound is valid even if m ′ = 0 and the initial schedule is a NE.
Theorem 2.5 When the NE is not necessarily achieved by a sequence of beneficial moves, the P oA is unbounded.

Proof:
Given m ′ , m 0 , δ and r, we construct an instance for which the P oA is r. Let ε be a small constant such that r = ε+δ ε . Assume that in the initial schedule, s 0 , there is a single job of length ε on each machine in M 0 (see Figure 1(a) ). Independent of the number of added machines, m ′ , a schedule in which each job is assigned to a machine in M 0 different from s 0 (j) and each machine in M 0 is assigned a single job, is a NE (see Figure 1(b) ). In this schedule, all jobs have the same cost of ε + δ. It is easy to verify that this schedule is a NE. The optimal schedule is identical to s 0 , where all jobs have the same cost of ε. The P oA is ε+δ ε = r. The more realistic scenario is when the NE is reached by performing beneficial moves, starting from a NE schedule s 0 . We provide an upper bound that is tight when m ′ mod m 0 = 1, and almost tight for any other case.
Theorem 2.6 The P oA when the NE is reached by better-RD is at most
m ′ −1 m 0 + 2.
Proof:
Denote by L 0 max , L max , OP T the makespan of the initial schedule s 0 , the makespan of the final NE s, and the minimal possible makespan, respectively. Let P = ∑ j p j denote the total initial length of the jobs. Let j be the shortest job on the most loaded machine in s 0 . Since s 0 is a NE, it holds that the gap between the maximal and minimal load is at most p j . Therefore, 8 
Let m ′ = km 0 + α for integers k and α < m 0 . By Theorem 2.6, we have that the P oA is at most
We show that for α = 1 and any k, the bound is tight. Almost tight analysis for other values of k, α is given in Appendix A. We present the construction of the lower bound in Fig. 2 , where m 0 = 3 and k = 1 (implying m ′ = 4). The initial assignment is given in Fig. 2(a) . (k + 1)B. The maximum load is (k + 2)B -achieved on the first machine. This assignment is a NE as the shortest job on the most loaded machine has length B -which is exactly the gap from the load on all other machines. Also, the other machines are perfectly balanced, therefore no migrations are beneficial. On the other hand, the following is an optimal assignment (see Figure The ratio between the maximal loads of the two assignments is
B+1 . The value of B was selected such that this is more than 2
Finally, we analyze the P oA for arbitrary initial assignment. The analysis is tight for any number of machines m 0 , m ′ and for any δ > 0.
Theorem 2.8 If the initial assignment is not necessary a NE, and the modified schedule is reached by better-RD, then the
P oA is at most m 0 + m ′ .
Proof:
Clearly, in the initial assignment,
max . Also, the makespan of the modified schedule is at least
We show that this bound is tight for any number of machines m 0 , m ′ and for any ρ > 0: We present the construction of the lower bound in Figure 3 . The initial assignment is given in Figure 3 Since the load on all the machines is balanced, the schedule is a NE.
On the other hand, the following is an optimal assignment (see Figure 3 The ratio between the maximal loads of the two assignments is
. The value of B was selected such that this is at least m 0 + m ′ − ρ. 
Machines' Removal
In this section we study the scenario in which the systems' modification involves the removal of machines. Every job assigned to a removed machine must be reassigned. As a result, additional jobs might also be interested in migrating. Recall that M 0 , M ′ denote the sets of initial and removed machines, respectively. Let 
Equilibrium Existence and Computation
We prove the existence of a NE and analyze the convergence rate of several policies. When better-RD is applied, all jobs are activated in an arbitrary order. When activated, each job migrates if it is on M ′ or if it can improve its cost. For every job j, if s 0 (j) ∈ M ′ , j must be activated at least once, move to a machine in M 1 , and be extended. Clearly, jobs must not migrate into machines in M ′ .
Theorem 3.1 Better-RD leads to a NE assignment for every instance of the load rebalancing game with removed machines and uniform extension penalty.
Proof:
Let s 1 be the schedule at the time after the last job migrated from M ′ . Thus, in s 1 all the jobs are scheduled on M 1 . Let (L 1 , . . . , L m 1 ) be the sorted load vector corresponding to s 1 . That is, L i is the load on the machine that has the i-th highest load. If s 1 is not a NE, then there exists a beneficial move to some job. We show that the sorted load vector obtained after performing a beneficial move is lexicographically smaller. This implies that a pure NE is reached after a finite number of beneficial moves.
Assume that job j can benefit by migrating from M a to M b . The move decreases the load on M a and increases the load on M b . Before the move
, as otherwise, j would not benefit from the move. In particular L a > L b . Combining this with the fact that the load on machines other than M a , M b is not changed, we get that the number of machines with load at least L a is decreasing. Therefore, the improvement step yields a sorted load vector that is lexicographically smaller than (L 1 , . . . , L m 1 ).
Consider the following specific application of better-RD: Two-phase max-length best-RD: In the first phase all the jobs assigned to machines in M ′ are activated. In the second phase all the jobs (now assigned to M 1 ) are activated in a non-increasing order of processing time p j without taking into account the extension penalty. In both phases, each job performs its best move.
We first demonstrate that unlike the 'adding machines' scenario, when machines are removed, a single phase of max-length best-RD might not end up in a NE: Consider the initial schedule on m 0 = 4 machines given in Figure 4(a) . Assume that the two right machines are removed and that δ = 1. The job of length 4 is the first to be activated by max-length best-response. It must move to a machine in M 1 and its best-response is to join the machine with load 1.5 ( Figure 4(b) ). The job of length 2 is not interested in moving. Next, the job of length 1.5 moves (Figure 4(c) ), and finally, the job of length 1 . Figure 4(d) gives the schedule after one phase of max-length best-response. This schedule is not NE, as the job of length 1.5 would benefit from returning to its initial location. Thus, a single phase of max-length best-response is not guaranteed to end up in a NE assignment.
However, linear time convergence to a NE is guaranteed by the above two-phase max-length best-RD.
Theorem 3.2 Two-phase max-length best-RD leads to a pure NE schedule.
Proof:
We first show the following claim.
Claim 3.3 The minimal load does not decrease during the second phase.
Proof:
We show that the minimal load does not decrease as a result of any move of a job j in the second phase. Assume that j moves from M a to M b . Denote by L 0 i , L 1 i the loads on machine M i before and after the move of job j, respectively. We show that min{L 0
Clearly, the load on any machine other than a,b does not change.
If
We show that during the second phase, once a job j was activated and perform its best response, it never has a beneficial move again. Assume by contradiction that the claim is false and let j be the first job for which a second beneficial move exists. We distinguish between two cases: 
We show that even if the load on M b increases after the join of job j, there is no machine
Assume that the load on M b increased due to a join of job k. Denote by t ′ the time after the move of job k to M b . M b ̸ = s 0 (k) since we assume that j is the first job that is migrating twice in the second phase. Since jobs are activated in non-increasing order of their length it holds that p j ≥ p k . Therefore, for any machine M c ,
2. s 0 (j) ∈ M 1 . The proof for this case is identical to the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Equilibrium Inefficiency
In this section we analyze the price of stability and the price of anarchy with various initial states and convergence algorithms. We show that the results differ from the classical load balancing game as well as from the machines' addition scenario. We note that by the discussion in Section 2.2, the P oS of the selfish load rebalancing game with removed machines and any job extension penalty is 1. As shown in Theorem 2.5, for machines' addition, the P oA is unbounded if the NE is not reached by performing beneficial migrations. The same example (or a similar one, if we add a request that the removed machines are non-empty) is valid also when the modification involves machines' removal. On the other hand, by assuming the NE is reached by better-RD, we can bound the P oA.
Theorem 3.4
The P oA assuming that s 0 is a NE and the modified NE is reached by better-RD is at most m 1 .
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Proof:
Let n ′ be the number of jobs assigned to M ′ in s 0 . It is easy to observe that along the application of better-RD, 
Given
. Also, let δ = 1 − ε and M a be the first machine in M 1 .
Consider the schedule s 0 in which there are We present the construction of the lower bound in Figure 5 . In this instance m 0 = 3 and m ′ = 3. The initial assignment is given in Figure 5(a) . 14 While the P oA for arbitrary better-RD is m 1 , a smaller bound can be shown if the NE is reached by two-phase better-RD. In the first phase, all the jobs that are assigned to machines in M ′ are activated, each performing its best move to a machine in M 1 . In the second phase, all the jobs (now assigned to M 1 ) are activated, possibly several times, in an arbitrary order. As this is a specific application of better-RD, convergence to a NE is guaranteed.
Theorem 3.6
The P oA assuming that s 0 is a NE and the modified NE is reached by two-phase better-RD is at most 2 −
Proof:
Denote by L 1 max , L 2 max the maximal load on machines in M 1 after the first and the second phase respectively. Since only beneficial moves are performed during the second phase, 
Clearly, j must migrate in any assignment, thus 
)OP T . The above analysis is tight even for two-phase best-RD. 
Given ρ, let z = ⌊
z(2−ρ) so that zε ≤ 1 and δ = 1 − ε. In the initial assignment, m 1 − 1 machines in M 1 are assigned a single job of length m 1 − 1 and one machine, M a , in M 1 , is assigned z jobs of length ε. The first machine in M ′ is assigned a single job of length m 1 − δ and on each of the other machines in M ′ there are z or z + 1 jobs of length ε, such that there are m 1 − 1 jobs of length ε on all M ′ machines. This schedule guarantees that the jobs of length ε are balanced and do not have a beneficial move. The longer jobs are also stable since each is assigned to a dedicated machine. Therefore, the initial schedule is a NE.
We present the construction of the lower bound in Figure 6 . In this instance m 0 = 6 and m ′ = 2. The initial assignment is given in Figure 6 (a). Assume that m ′ machines are removed and two-phase best-RD is performed. A possible NE is a one in which, in the first phase, the ε-jobs migrate to M a and the job of length m 1 − δ migrates to a different machine M b in M 1 (see Figure 6( 
In the second phase no job migrates since the load on the other
On the other hand, the following is an optimal assignment (see Figure 6 The ratio between the maximal loads of the two assignments is
The value of ε was selected such that the P oA is more than 2 −
Finally, we bound the P oA assuming the initial schedule is not a NE. The upper bound proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.8. The lower bound follows from Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.8 If the initial assignment is not necessary a NE, and the modified schedule is reached by better-RD, then the P oA is at most m 1 and this is tight.
Analysis of Coordinated Deviations
In this section we assume that agents can coordinate their strategies and perform a coordinated deviation. Recall that a set of players Γ ⊆ N forms a coalition if there exists a move where each job j ∈ Γ strictly reduces its cost. A schedule s is a strong equilibrium (SE) if there is no coalition Γ ⊆ N that has a beneficial move from s.
It is not difficult to see (using the arguments used for the classic load balancing game [2] ) that for any instance of the dynamic game, a SE exists. In particular, an assignment in which the vector of loads is lexicographically minimal is a SE. On the other hand, as we show, finding a SE schedule, or deciding whether a NE schedule s is a SE is NP-hard. Moreover, given a set of jobs, it is NP-hard to determine whether this set has a beneficial coordinated deviation. Theorem 4.1 Let s be a NE schedule in a system after a modification took place. For any δ ≥ 0, it is NP-hard to determine whether s is a SE.
Equilibrium Inefficiency
We present tight bounds for the strong price of anarchy. By the discussion in Section 2.2, the strong price of stability is 1.
Theorem 4.2 The SPoA of load rebalancing games with uniform extension penalty with added or removed machines is at most 3.
Proof:
Denote the initial schedule by s 0 and the SE schedule by s. Let L max (s 0 ), L max (s) be the makespan of schedule s 0 and s respectively. If δ > OP T , we distinguish between two cases.
1. Adding machines: If δ > OP T , then in the optimal solution no job migrates. Thus, L max (s 0 ) = OP T . We show that s = s 0 , which clearly implies that s is optimal. Assume that s ̸ = s 0 . Each of the jobs for which s(j) ̸ = s 0 (j) has cost larger than δ in s.
, all these jobs form a coalition for which returning to s 0 is a beneficial move, contradicting the assumption that s is SE.
2. Removing machines: If no job was assigned on any of the m ′ removed machines in s 0 , then the analysis of "adding machines" is valid. Otherwise, at least one job must migrate in the optimal solution. This job's cost is at least p j + δ. Contradicting the fact that OP T < δ.
Otherwise, δ ≤ OP T . It is easy to observe that In any SE, at least one job has cost at most OPT, as otherwise, all jobs form together a coalition that prefers the optimal schedule. We distinguish between two cases:
2. L max (s) is determined by two or more jobs. Let j be the job with the smallest processing time on a machine with load L max (s). Let L min (s) be the machine with the minimal load.
We show that the above analysis is tight even when the initial schedule is a SE in the cases of adding and removing machines. For simplicity, the instances below are described for specific values of m 0 and m ′ . It can be generalized by scaling and/or adding dummy jobs. 
Given ρ, let ε < 1 be a small constant and let B be an integer such that ρ ≥ 4ε
B+ε . Fix δ = B − ε. The initial schedule, on m 0 = 3 machines, is given in Figure 7 (a). Note that each machine accommodates one long job of length B and one tiny job of length ε (job-lengthes indices in the figure denote s 0 (j) -to help us follow the migrations). Since the load is perfectly balanced, s 0 is a strong equilibrium. Assume that m ′ = 2 machines are added. Consider the schedule s given in Figure 7(b) . We have L max (s) = 2B + δ = 3B − ε. We show that s is a SE by showing that no job can be part of a coalition. Note that the current cost of each ε-job is ε + δ = B, therefore, no job will join an ε-job on its current machine. Moreover, an ε-job will participate in a coalition only if it returns to its original machine alone. Therefore, after any coalitional move, three different machines will be dedicated to the ε-jobs. Since there are three B i jobs and two machines without ε-jobs, there is a machine with two B i jobs on it. At least one of which is extended. Thus, in any coalitional move, one machine has load 2B + δ which is not beneficial for the jobs assigned to it. Thus, no coalition exists.
An optimal schedule for the modified instance is given in Figure 7 (c). 
Given ρ, let ε < 1 be a small constant and let B be an integer such that ρ ≥ The proof that s is a SE is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 4.3. An optimal schedule for the modified instance is given in Figure 8 
Summary and Future Work
We considered a dynamic variant of the classic load balancing game, in which machines are added or removed and job migrations are associated with job's extension To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results considering games with migration costs. We provided answers to the basic questions arising in this model. Specifically, we explored the existence and calculation of Nash equilibrium and strong equilibrium and provided tight bounds for NE and SE inefficiency -in general and under various dynamics. Our results show that the existence of migration penalty might lead to poor stable schedules, however, if the modification is a result of a sequence of improvement steps or, better, if the sequence of improvement steps can be supervised in some way (by forcing the jobs play in a specific order, or select their best response) then the modified schedule approximates well an optimal one, with approximation ratio similar to the classic load balancing game. Thus, while migration costs discourage changes and increase the stability of any given configuration, it is still guaranteed that any stable configuration that is reached by natural dynamics has a reasonable social cost.
Possible directions for future work include the study of heterogenous systems, in particular unrelated machines, or non-uniform extension penalty. That is, for each i, i ′ , j we are given an extension parameter δ i,i ′ ,j such that job j is extended by δ i,i ′ ,j if it migrates from machine i to machine i ′ . Another interesting variant is proportional extension, i.e., a migration of job j extends its processing time from p j to p j (1 + δ).
Our analysis of coordinated deviation show that the SPoA heavily depends on the value of δ. Another direction for future work is to analyze instances in which δ is bounded by the instance parameters, e.g., when δ ≤ p min . Analyzing equilibrium inefficiency with respect to the objective of minimizing the total players' cost is another possible direction.
Finally, in our model a migration of job j affects all the jobs assigned to j's target machine. Another possible game can be defined by assuming individual penalties. Specifically, migrations are associated with a cost, but this cost is covered by the job and does not affect other jobs. The cost of a job j assigned to machine i is L i if i = s 0 (j) and L i + δ otherwise, where the load is the total processing time of jobs assigned to machine i. With individual penalties we can also consider accumulated migration costs -applied to jobs performing multiple migrations during better-RD. Such a model corresponds to systems in which the physical migration is associated with cost, unlike our model that suit systems in which the cost corresponds to some preprocessing or machine's set-up time.
X verify that this assignment is a NE. The most loaded machine, M 1 , has load (k + 3)X. All other machines are balanced and have load at least (k + 2)X. Since the shortest job on M 1 has length X, no job has a beneficial move. The maximum load is (k + 3)X -achieved on the first machine. This assignment is a NE as the shortest job on the most loaded machine has length X -which is exactly the gap from the load on all other machines. Also, the other machines are perfectly balanced, therefore no migrations are beneficial.
On the other hand, a better possible assignment results from the following migrations: The tiny jobs remain on M 0 . Every new and original machine is assigned one long job and one medium job. The total load on every new machine is X + Y + 2δ = B + 2δ < B + 2. The total load on every original machine is at most X + Y + δ + 1 < B + 2. The addition of δ is due to the migration of a medium job, the addition of 1 is due to the tiny jobs 4 .
The ratio between the maximal loads of the two assignments is (k+3)X B+2 . The value of B was selected such that this is more than k + 2 + 
B Coordinated Deviations -Lower Bound for the SPoA
We show that the bound SP oA ≥ 2 + δ OP T is tight even if the initial schedule is a SE, and the final SE is reached by a sequence of coalitional improvement steps. 
Proof:
We . The initial schedule is given in Figure 11 (a). Note that 1/ε jobs of length ε are assigned on the fourth machine. The first machine has load 3B − 2δ + 1 + 2ε, the other three machines have load 3B − 2δ + 1. Since L max (s 0 ) = L min (s 0 )+2ε and the shortest job on L max (s 0 ) is B +ε−δ, s 0 is clearly a NE. Moreover, since all the other machines are balances, it is also a SE. Assume that m ′ = 8 machines are added. Figure 11 (b) presents an optimal schedule after the modification. L max (OP T ) = B +ε. Figure 13 presents a possible sequence of coalitional improvement moves.
First, the ε-jobs migrate to two new machines. After this move, two M ′ machines have z + 1 jobs of length ε + δ each, forming the load of (z + 1)(ε + δ) = (z + 1)δ ′ = ( B δ ′ + 1)δ ′ = B + δ ′ . Two jobs migrate from machines M 0 (2), M 0 (3), M 0 (4), each to an empty machine in M ′ . The schedule after the first move is shown in Figure 13(a) .
Next, the B 1 + ε job performs an improvement step and moves from M 0 (1) to M 0 (2), forming the schedule in Figure 13(b) . Then, the B 2 job performs an improvement step and moves from M 0 (2) to M 0 (3), forming the schedule in Figure 13 
Assume that s ′ is not a SE, therefore a coalition exists. Clearly, B ′ 1 will not participate in any coalition because it reaches its minimal cost when scheduled alone on the fourth machine. This implies that the ε-jobs will not migrate back to machine 4. If the ε-jobs participate in a coalition, then after the move they split among at least two machines without any B-job. In such a schedule the remaining m 1 − 1 jobs of length at least B must be assigned on m 1 − 2 machines. Therefore, at least one of the machines is assigned two jobs of length at least B. No jobs except for B 1 and B 2 is ready to participate in such a coalition. Clearly, B 1 , B 2 alone cannot initiate such a deviation.
An optimal schedule for the modified instance is given in Figure 12 
